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NSC review completed.

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re minutes of 9th meeting of NIA re term "strategic and national policy int" recommend this matter be referred to ICAPS at next meeting of IAB				
CROSS REFERENCE				
Barman				
SUBJECT				
ROUTING				
FORM NO. 10-1 SEP 1944				

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 1I.A.B. 4th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 5106,  
New War Department Building,  
on Thursday, 9 May 1946, at 1430

1. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
 (C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 7 circulated in C.I.G. 7/1.

2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS  
 (C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 1/1 proposed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as circulated in C.I.G. 1/2.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON USSR  
 (C.I.G. 8 and C.I.G. 8/1)

For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 8 proposed by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and circulated in C.I.G. 8/1.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,  
 Secretary, N.I.A.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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COPY NO.

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I.A.B. 5th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 5136-E  
New War Department Building  
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 1430

1. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA  
BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS  
(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2; C.I.G. 1/3)

For consideration of the recommendation by  
the Director of Central Intelligence obtained  
in C.I.G. 1/3.

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

For discussion of the views of the Intelligence  
Advisory Board concerning the first issue of  
the C.I.G. Weekly Summary which will be distri-  
buted on Friday, 7 June 1946.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,  
Secretary, N.I.A.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 1I.A.B. 9th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169,  
New War Department Building,  
on Thursday, 31 October 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
(C.I.G. 16 and 16/1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 16 and 16/1.

2. PLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE  
(C.I.G. 17)

For consideration of the recommendation contained in C.I.G. 17.

3. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA  
(To be circulated)

For consideration of a report on the above subject which will be circulated prior to the meeting.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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I.A.B. 9th Meeting

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COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDAFor the Meeting to be held in Room 2169New War Department Building  
on Thursday, 7 November 1946, at 2:30 P.M.1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS -- CHINA  
(C.I.G. 19)For consideration of the recommendation contained  
in C.I.G. 19, as agreed at the last I.A.B. meeting.2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
(C.I.G. 15)For further consideration of the problems presented  
in C.I.G. 15.3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC  
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
(C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 13/1)For consideration of the committee report contained  
in C.I.G. 13/1.

JAMES S. LAY JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 10th Meeting

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I.A.B. 11th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178  
New War Department Building  
on Tuesday, 26 November 1946, at 10:00 A.M.

1. COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES  
(C.I.G. 18/2)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 18/2.

2. PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON U.S.S.R.  
(C.I.G. 20)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 20.

3. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES  
(C.I.G. 21)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 21.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 11th Meeting

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I.A.B. 12th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178  
New War Department Building  
on Tuesday, 17 December 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

1. OVER-ALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION  
OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL  
ESTABLISHMENTS  
(C.I.G. 22)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in  
C.I.G. 22.

J. S. EARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 12th Meeting

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I.A.B. 13th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117  
North Interior Building  
(18th and F Streets N.W.)  
on Thursday, 15 May 1947 at 2:30 P. M.

1. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(I.A.B. #1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in the report of the ad hoc committee appointed to draft a proposed N.I.A. Directive on "The Coordination of Intelligence Production."

2. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS  
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(C.I.G. 24)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 24.

3. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
(I.A.B. #2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in I.A.B. #2.

J. S. FARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 13th Meeting

**SECRET**I.A.B. 16th MeetingCOPY NO. 1INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117  
North Interior Building  
on Thursday, 11 September 1947 at 2:00 P.M.

1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(CIG 24/2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in CIG 24/2 and its enclosure thereto.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in the enclosure to IAB 1/2.

3. REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
GROUP

For discussion of the plan outlined in a memorandum to the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 15 August 1947 - Subject: "Reorganization of Central Intelligence Group".

J. S. FARMAN  
Secretary, N.I.A.

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5106  
New War Department Building  
on Thursday, 9 May 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of  
 Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to  
 the Secretary of State in Charge of Re-  
 search and Intelligence  
 Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief  
 of Staff, G-2, W.D.G.S.  
 Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Ad-  
 miral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval In-  
 telligence)  
 Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant  
 Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence  
 Mr. D. M. Ladd, for Items 1 and 2 (representing  
 Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal  
 Bureau of Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central  
 Intelligence Group

Colonel M. N. Huston, G-2

Captain R. K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.

Colonel E. P. Mussett, A-2

Lt. Colonel F. K. Newcomer, G-2

[redacted]	Central Intelligence Group	25X1
[redacted]	Central Intelligence Group	25X1
Colonel R. H. Boberg, Central Intelligence Group (for Item 1), Central		25X1
[redacted]	(for Items 2-4), Central	25X1
[redacted]	Intelligence Group	25X1
Colonel W. A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group		
Colonel T. J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group		

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Mr. James S. Ley, Jr., Secretary, National  
 Intelligence Authority  
 Mr. J. K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

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I.A.B. 4th Meeting

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1. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
(C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)

The proposed amendments to C.I.G. 7, as contained in C.I.G. 7/1, were taken under consideration.

ADMIRAL SOUERS was of the opinion that the screening committee recommended by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in C.I.G. 7/1 would be difficult to administer and, in fact, was an unnecessary duplication of other provisions of the paper, since Paragraph 8 of C.I.G. 7 provided that no individuals could be certified for duties with the Central Intelligence Group until after a security inquiry which would include a records check of member agencies of the I.A.B.

COMMODORE REND felt that it is impossible to do too much in the interests of security. He saw no completely desirable substitute for the proposed formal screening committee, even if it were to involve some degree of duplication, and he was sure that he spoke the views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence in this connection.

ADMIRAL SOUERS agreed that all practicable security measures should be taken even if they involved extra work, but he thought all such measures should be practical and capable of efficient administration.

In the course of further discussion, in which other members expressed satisfaction with the language of the section as written, COLONEL BOBERG proposed as the basis of a generally agreeable solution the revision of Paragraph 7 of C.I.G. 7 to read:

"7. Reports of investigations will be subject to review in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verify that member departments other than the nominating department have cleared the nominee. Final decision as to acceptability of an individual for an assignment to the Central Intelligence Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence."

The amendment was accepted.

The recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the State Department were then considered. ADMIRAL SOUERS said that he agreed with Mr. Hoover's criticism of Paragraph 9 of C.I.G. 7 and believed that the remedy should be the addition to that paragraph of the following provision:

"In each case of clearance based on a previous satisfactory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service, a check of the appropriate records in the Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service, War Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance certificate."

MR. LADD and other members of the Intelligence Advisory Board agreed to this change.

DR. LANGER set forth the purpose of the State Department recommendations covering exceptional cases, but after discussion

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I.A.B. 4th Meeting

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it was agreed that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 (Paragraph 13) were satisfactory to all concerned. After accepting further minor amendments offered by the Central Planning Staff,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 7, subject to the amendments above (Enclosure to C.I.G. 7 subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 8).

2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS  
(C.I.G. 1/1 and C.I.G. 1/2)

ADMIRAL SOUERS reviewed the history of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). He noted the recommendation in his own report (C.I.G. 1/1) that the service be continued under C.I.G. direction and War Department administration, and invited attention to the dissenting recommendation of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in C.I.G. 1/2, that the project be administered by the Department of State or by the C.I.G. directly. On the second point, Admiral Souers could not agree with General Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group should administer such a service directly. The C.I.G. is not an independent agency and thus is not empowered to sign contracts, nor does it have technical personnel readily available. While the C.I.G. was authorized to perform "such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally", he believed the most efficient procedure in this case was probably that outlined in C.I.G. 1/1.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed it would be difficult for the C.I.G. to assume direct administrative control of FBIS at this time. Yet he felt that the position of the War Department should be appreciated and understood. As he saw it, the War Department had accepted the interim responsibility for administering FBIS until the end of this fiscal year, in order to serve the many Government agencies interested in the product of monitoring. Now, more than ever, it was clear that the bulk of the information obtained by this means was not primarily related to military intelligence; rather it related to political and economic intelligence, and for this reason was surely of greater interest to the Department of State than to the War Department. He doubted whether G-2 could continue to justify requests for FBIS appropriations for these reasons, and he felt there should be no delay in placing the administration of FBIS in an agency of primary interest, such as State, or in C.I.G. as a centralized service.

ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that the disposition proposed in C.I.G. 1/1 would require the approval of the National Intelligence Authority. Should the Authority agree that the War Department was the appropriate agency to administer the service, it could be presumed that the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy could defend the conclusion in relation to appropriations.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought it would be easier for the three Secretaries to defend the service within State or C.I.G. than in the War Department.

ADMIRAL SOUERS said he had originally thought the State Department would be the ideal lodgment for FBIS, and in fact he believed the former Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence (Mr. McCormack) had once held the same view. However, there had recently been so much question as to the scope of the opera-

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tions to be undertaken by State that he now thought it best to leave the administrative responsibility where it was--that is, in the War Department--with over-all direction from C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that, since only about 5% of all foreign broadcasts are monitored, priorities must be constantly shifted to meet the most important requirements. The War Department is unable to anticipate the shifting requirements for political and economic information, and thus to adjust its coverage of foreign output, as promptly as would a directly interested agency such as the Department of State. Moreover, all that would be necessary for such a change would be to transfer the existing technical group and point their activities in the direction of major interest.

DR. LANGER said he recognized the force of General Vandenberg's argument. Much of the material which FBIS was obliged to cover dealt with political, economic, and psychological developments of the greatest interest and importance to the State Department. It might be logical to place FBIS administration under State. At the same time, in view of the current heavy burden on State Department administrative facilities, he was not sure that the Department could now assume a new responsibility of such dimensions. The subject was one on which he could not express a final judgment without checking with his own Department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG added that G-2 would be glad to lend to State the services of necessary experts, and to arrange for a gradual transfer of administrative responsibility, if such measures would assist a solution.

After concluding discussion, and on the motion of Admiral Souers,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

- a. Deferred action on C.I.G. 1/1 pending further study.
  - b. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence directed the Central Planning Staff to consult with appropriate officials in G-2 and the State Department as to the practicability of transferring the monitoring function to the State Department, and to recommend any revisions in C.I.G. 1/1 deemed appropriate.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON USSR  
(C.I.G. 8 and C.I.G. 8/1)

The memorandum of the Director of Central Intelligence (C.I.G. 8) and the proposed amendments thereto (C.I.G. 8/1) were considered by the Members.

After discussion, the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 8 were adopted:

- a. In Paragraph 3 the fourth sentence was revised to read: "The Planning Committee will select a chairman from among its representatives. The Secretary shall be furnished by a member agency by mutual agreement."
- b. In paragraph 4.a., the words "as necessary and available" were inserted at the end of the second sentence.
- c. In paragraph 4.b., the word "practicable" was inserted at the end of the third sentence.

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4. DISTRIBUTION OF C.I.G. DAILY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS advised that inquiry had been received from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to the possibility of his being placed on the distribution for the C.I.G. Daily Summary. He noted that since the distribution of the Summary had been established by the National Intelligence Authority, any increased distribution would require the Authority's approval.

After discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence would discuss informally with the Secretary of State the distribution of the C.I.G. Daily Summary to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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I.A.B. 4th Meeting

Notes on TAB 4<sup>th</sup> MayCIG 7

- V - Don't like for reason that very dangerous <sup>that</sup> ~~sec~~, <sup>should be preserved</sup> setup  
 - Sanctity of files of any organ <sup>(off record)</sup>
- S - not sound because been checked by G-8a  
 before certified
- R ✓ Can't do too much on security - formal  
 screening bd. <sup>know</sup> & Adm Ingles will insist -  
 One may like but another
- L - Won't be done by G-8a?
- R - <sup>Adm Ingles</sup> insists on formal bd. meeting
- V - Will not gain <sup>by my man</sup> because will be already cleared
- L - Checked by own agency & then referred to  
 screening bd.
- S - Doesn't seem necessary to certify &  
 then screen - Duplication
- V - In effect, Ingles make G-2 resp. for clearance  
 of State & Navy people - Why accept resp. -  
 Have check when my people make  
 records check
- S - Difficult admin
- R - Have one of your men on comm.  
 Bobbey - Only reports <sup>under G-7</sup> could be favorable.
- McD - CIG 7 accepted w/o change
- Bobbey - Changed wording OK
- S - Added sentence <sup>99</sup> OK

~~who will verify records check with all other  
 departments.~~

L - What had in mind was poss. employ fellow here in Canada - might have US parents - By rigid rules lose very useful person - to

S - Think unusual case that other depts wouldn't also clear that man - Reason ~~no~~ don't object to these <sup>complaints</sup> measures because

Lay ~~OK~~ 8a(2) OK

Sands <sup>nothing all wanted</sup> Eliminate those coming over with ad hoc or witnesses. OK

### CIG 1/1

S - Reviewed history of FBIS & made pts. at issue  
- Agree on interest (State heaviest because of propaganda interest) - so feeling of war if goes to any dept. to State or to CIG under central services provision  
- Raise question w/ V abt more efficiently -  
Hard for CIG (not int. agency, cannot sign contracts, has no radio personnel)

V - Agree hard for CIG to take over - stepped in when money relatively free on interim basis - now money not free - get into eight channels either state or CIG - G-2 not <sup>able to</sup> defend on intell basis & everyone suffer.

S - If NIA approves - all should defend

V - Easier to defend if in State or CIG, rather than G-2 than CIG

S - Orig thought State & agreed by me - But so much <sup>informal</sup> talk leave where is - Like to see listed on one <sup>new</sup> page column - as far as direction, CIG

(8)

V - State more eff for all because even in  
bnsday coverage sub. 5% To cover constantly  
stuff - Have to know continually what State  
interest is

L - Would have to be enlarged?

V - Eventually build to 5% if expert like  
Gallys figures coverage by sampling

S - Which broadcasts most interesting, could  
set up mech for that - Other aspect is  
technical

V - Have <sup>tech.</sup> gp - All have to do is take gp  
& pt them to dissection of interest - Separate  
from Sig C

L - Recognize force of what V says - Pol, econ,  
psych character - Regard material extremely  
imp - If 5%, must should direct toward  
iron curtain - Wonder <sup>view of Bureau on</sup> if State admin  
if L should take now

V - Glad to assist w/ people now running it

S - hat desire to limit on War - must work  
out on reasonable basis - Pass over at  
meeting & let L look into since just  
stepped in

V - Glad to have exp. talk - do it by gradual basis  
any way you desire.

L - Have CPS in touch with G-2 experts &  
State. & see what can be worked out.

CIG 8

P - OK either way - If changed, State change  
rep.

L - Why not have Secy vote since Chairman  
of Planning Comm.

(2) - Practical people working proposed - Big job  
& like free to do it <sup>as Secy</sup>

P - Like as is

McD - Is interim until CIG takes over? - If not,  
establishes precedent

P - This will be long time - not thing that CIG takes <sup>over</sup>

McD - Getting open & question whether desire to  
get that open.

P - Two column - Secy PC, Ch WC to ~~vote~~  
make continuity

L - all more reason to have Secy have vote

R - Val. man as rep. - If made Secy, lose  
val man

Davis - Then have have 2 votes

P - Only one vote for each dept.

R - If State spare full time, OK

(2) - All right now but if personalities change

P - Don't think pick Secy if dept can't furnish

S - how make State furnish 2 rep.

Say - leave out "and" - vote.

Davis - As necess & avail. OK

McD - Amend.

Moore - allow people <sup>in each agency</sup> to have word in priority as

P - "Practically" OK

- S - Reg from Hoover that, since furnishes daily mail from Carter, could help in evaluation to receive Daily Summary - question whether IAB would accept info & state.
- MD - So helpful think shouldn't hurt relations. May not take so nice state.
- V - Feel things in book Sec. It wouldn't want handled. Hoover knows directly. might be OK if does assume only H & Sec office used it.
- L - Can't say but should think in business might be adv. to H & Secs. - no harm on restrictive basis.
- V - H very safe if understands why & how you can go that worried abt security - Thinking more of Byrnes fear of things going even so far as now.
- V - Valuable way of getting H to look for things of C/S interest.
- S - Talk over w/ Sec.

CONFIDENTIALCOPY NO. 26I.A.B. 5th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132  
New War Department Building  
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of  
 Central Intelligence  
 Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to  
 the Secretary of State for Research and  
 Intelligence  
 Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director  
 of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)  
 Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear  
 Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval  
 Intelligence)  
 Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant  
 Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence  
 Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,  
 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central  
 Intelligence Group  
 Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2  
 Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.  
 Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.  
 Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2  
 Lt. Colonel F.K. Newcomer, G-2  
 [redacted], Central Intelligence Group  
 [redacted], USN, Central Intelligence Group      25X1  
 Mr. L.L. Montague, Central Intelligence Group  
 [redacted], Central Intelligence Group  
 [redacted], Central Intelligence Group      25X1  
 Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group  
 Colonel T.J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National  
 Intelligence Authority  
 Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

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IAB 5th Meeting

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1. PROVISION OF MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS  
OF FOREIGN POWERS  
(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2; and C.I.G. 1/3)

ADMIRAL SOUERS recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg's suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. ADMIRAL SOUERS felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.

DR. LANGER underscored the reasons leading to State's conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like--all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.

GENERAL VANDENBERG observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.

In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by ADMIRAL SOUERS that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.

After concluding discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5).

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS invited discussion and criticism of the trial issue of the C.I.G. Weekly Summary circulated on 7 June. The discussion which followed centered on two issues developed by DR. LANGER: first, whether interpretive articles such as the Weekly contained could be prepared more effectively in C.I.G.,

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as in the trial issue, or by specialists in the contributing departments; and second, the suggestion that the Weekly concentrate on items where the C.I.G. has something new or novel to add to the normal intelligence produced by the departments.

As to the first point, DR. LANGER emphasized that he was wholly in favor of the undertaking represented by the Weekly Summary. However, it was essential to make the Weekly the best publication of which "this city" is capable. The job of interpretation needed to be done by people who have "responsibility and weight". For instance, he thought it inevitable that the best political comment would be obtained from the political sections of the State Department, where there was responsibility for policy as well as analysis, and that C.I.G. could hardly build up comparably well-informed groups of specialists within its own staff. On this assumption, he concluded that perhaps the preparation of articles for the Weekly should be transferred to the departmental experts. In this case, DR. LANGER thought, the C.I.G. editors would be left with the true function of correlating political intelligence judgments from State with related military judgments from the armed services. On his second point, he believed it might be a mistake for the Weekly to offer interpretations of matters already well covered in other publications, or where the Weekly did not have "something to add".

In acknowledging these issues, MR. MONTAGUE observed that the Weekly was not, of course, to be a summary of all the incidents of a week but an attempt to put into perspective some of the most important incidents and trends. Most of the events with which the Weekly dealt had already been reported briefly--and without opportunity for elucidation--in the C.I.G. daily summaries preceding. The Weekly was to provide background and "depth". The fact that the trial issue was heavily "political" in substance reflected the undermanned state of the reports staff; he was awaiting the arrival of several specialists from the contributing departments.

As to sources of material for the Weekly, MR. MONTAGUE thought it was clear that these would always be primarily the departmental cables and telegrams, plus departmental summaries such as the G-2 Weekly Summary and the State Department situation reports. The reports staff did not receive "raw" or unevaluated data. A much greater degree of contact with the departmental specialists was imperative, he agreed, and when the full staff had been assembled such contact should and would be continuous.

ADMIRAL SOUERS commented that C.I.G. had been fully aware of departmental responsibilities for the analysis of intelligence--the State Department's responsibility for foreign political intelligence, and so on. There was no attempt to compete with specialized summaries produced in State, War, and Navy. On the other hand, as he saw it, the problem was to produce a "reader's digest" which would collect and condense the most significant judgments from all those sources. He had been reluctant to begin the Weekly without an adequately manned staff and had given some thought to asking Members of I.A.B. to designate departmental experts who could meet with the reports staff on a regular basis, to insure policy screening at least--though not necessarily to write the articles themselves.

GENERAL VANDENBERG proposed that the Weekly continue publication under the common observation of the Members of I.A.B., and that he be advised whenever it was found that departmental views had been distorted or otherwise improperly represented.

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Specifically, he asked Dr. Langer to arrange a means whereby political intelligence texts could be promptly checked when necessary with a State Department specialist. He transmitted further specific comments and suggestions from G-2 regarding the trial issue to Mr. Montague.

The Members of I.A.B. were in agreement with General Vandenberg's proposal.

COMMODORE REND commented that it was essential to commence regular publication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that might be inevitable in early issues; and GENERAL McDONALD and MR. LADD thought that, in view of all the circumstances, the reports staff should be congratulated on a good beginning.

3. PROVISIONS FOR COORDINATING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

(C.I.G. 9)

ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that replies had not yet been received from all Members regarding C.I.G. 9, which had been circulated for informal consideration. After brief discussion, during which it was agreed to reduce the classification of the paper to "Restricted",

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to N.I.A. as N.I.A. 4.)

4. REMARKS BY ADMIRAL SOUERS

ADMIRAL SOUERS said he wanted to take occasion, on being relieved as Director of Central Intelligence, to express to all Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation for the unstinted cooperation he had received from each one. He took great satisfaction in turning over his duties to General Vandenberg.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in an acknowledgment in behalf of all those present, expressed the hope that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral Souers.

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I.A.B. 5th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 5136-E  
New War Department Building  
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 1430

1. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA  
BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS  
(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2; C.I.G. 1/3)

For consideration of the recommendation by  
the Director of Central Intelligence obtained  
in C.I.G. 1/3.

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

For discussion of the views of the Intelligence  
Advisory Board concerning the first issue of  
the C.I.G. Weekly Summary which will be distri-  
buted on Friday, 7 June 1946.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.,

Secretary, N.I.A.

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 33I.A.B. 9th MeetingCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169,  
New War Department Building,  
on Thursday, 31 October 1946, at 2:30 p.m.

1. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
(C.I.G. 16 and 16/1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 16 and 16/1.

2. PLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE  
(C.I.G. 17)

For consideration of the recommendation contained in C.I.G. 17.

3. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA  
(To be circulated)

For consideration of a report on the above subject which will be circulated prior to the meeting.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169  
New War Department Building  
on Thursday, 31 October 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of  
 Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the  
 Secretary of State for Research and In-  
 telligence  
 Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director  
 of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.  
 Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval  
 Intelligence  
 Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant  
 Chief of Air Staff -2

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State  
 Mr. James Heck, Department of State  
 Colonel E. K. Wright, Central Intelligence  
 Group (for Item 1 only)  
 Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.  
 Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.N.  
 Colonel E. F. Mussett, U.S.A.  
 Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.  
 Mr. John S. Earman, Assistant Secretary, N.I.A.

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~~TOP SECRET~~1. AGENDA AND WEEKLY DATE FOR I.A.B. MEETING

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Mr. Lay to explain why there were three items left off the agenda of today's meeting.

MR. LAY stated that some of the I.A.B. members were not ready to discuss C.I.G. 13 and 15, and ICAPS was still working on C.I.G. 18.

MR. LAY then asked if it was agreeable with the Board to establish a standard time each week for I.A.B. meetings. He explained that in the event there was nothing to come before the Board, the members would be notified in advance and the meeting would be cancelled for that week.

## THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to set aside 1430 each Thursday as the normal time for I.A.B. meetings, with the understanding that the Secretary would advise each member early in the week whether a meeting was to be held.

2. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
(C.I.G. 16 and C.I.G. 16/1)

GENERAL VANDENBERG asked Mr. Lay to give a brief explanation as to how ORE-1 was prepared and coordinated with the departments.

MR. LAY stated that C.I.G. was asked to prepare this estimate on Friday to be ready the following Tuesday. He also brought out the fact that the estimate was based on an existing J.I.S. study together with cables received from Moscow, and that it was coordinated with specialized representatives of the I.A.B. before going forward.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he believed C.I.G. would have difficulty in meeting deadlines if the concurrence of each I.A.B. member had to be obtained by a voting system prior to the forwarding of the estimates.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that it was his idea to separate concurrences of estimates into three parts, i.e., the Daily Summary, the Weekly Summary, and formal O.R.E. estimates. He further stated that the Naval members of O.R.E. are perfectly competent to represent and concur for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the preparation of daily and weekly summaries. However, in the case of formal O.R.E. estimates, Admiral Inglis stated that he was in favor of using the J.I.C. vote method, time permitting, and that he would like to have two to three days to consider each paper. If time does not permit, he felt that the paper could be put through with a statement that the estimate does not bear the concurrence of the dissenting department but that such concurrence or comments would follow. Admiral Inglis further stated that while the relationship of J.I.S. to C.I.G. is not up for consideration at this time and is the subject of another paper, he believed its solution would go a long way in solving this present problem.

GENERAL SAMFORD stated that A-2 would like the opportunity to comment on all estimates. He said that he realized that this procedure would be time-consuming, and believed possibly that an

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A-2 member of ICAPS could be designated to concur for A-2 on the estimates in question.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that an A-2 member of ICAPS could not be the person to be used by A-2 in concurring on these estimates, since ICAPS is concerned with coordination problems rather than the preparation or content of intelligence estimates.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the Naval members of O.R.E. working on estimates would at all times be in collaboration with people in O.N.I., hence both O.N.I. and the Naval members of O.R.E. would be kept abreast of developments and the latter would know the Navy Department's views.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the question regarding concurrence in the Daily Summary involves possible omissions which can distort the picture. He said that omissions had not happened lately, but he felt that General Vandenberg would be willing to let Naval members of O.R.E. complain to Admiral Inglis if they felt that omissions had occurred.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed the belief that the whole situation would be clarified when the I.A.B. considered C.I.G. 15.

MR. EDDY said that in the meantime he favored appointing an aide or a staff member as a representative in O.R.E. to check estimates as proposed in C.I.G. 16/1. His reason for favoring this solution, rather than C.I.G. 16, was that, although Army and Naval officers remain in uniform and loyal to their service, civilian employees are now becoming employees of C.I.G. rather than State. Former State Department employees in C.I.G. will therefore have no direct loyalties to State.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was fundamentally opposed to considering a man assigned to C.I.G. as partially responsible to him. He felt that such a man owes his whole loyalty to C.I.G., and that it is impossible to divide his loyalties.

GENERAL SAMFORD thought that this was true except in ICAPS, where he felt there was a residual representation of departmental interests.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he understood General Chamberlin's point of view, but he also understood that C.I.G. was to be a cooperative interdepartmental venture. He could see the difference in the situation regarding the State Department. However, in the case of Naval officers, while they were working in C.I.G. he felt they had an additional duty representing the Navy. If they felt that Navy's interests were not properly represented in C.I.G., then they should express this feeling to Admiral Inglis as their contact with the Navy Department. He reiterated that he understood General Chamberlin's viewpoint and granted that this situation may cause trouble in the future, but felt that there had been no difficulty so far.

MR. EDDY said that he thought Admiral Inglis' viewpoint would definitely cause trouble in the future, especially for the State Department.

ADMIRAL INGLIS expressed the understanding that there would always be a few people in C.I.G. who continued to be State Department employees, such as Mr. Huddle.

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MR. EDDY agreed that there would be a few key State Department positions in C.I.G., but these would carry on liaison with the State Department rather than be State Department representatives. He thought that this would encourage a closer relation with State, but expressed the belief that if one of these State Department people assigned to C.I.G. felt that State's interests were not properly represented, he would appeal not to the State Department, but to General Vandenberg.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN compared this to the situation on the General Staff, where personnel are expected to solve problems as they see it in the General Staff rather than from the viewpoint of the basic arm or service from which they come. He thought that if Admiral Inglis' interpretation prevailed, it would destroy C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the discussion led back to the solution proposed in C.I.G. 16/1.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that General Vandenberg was appointed to head C.I.G. and that the I.A.B. were only advisers. He felt that General Vandenberg was placed here by the N.I.A. to perform functions assigned by that Authority. He did not feel that the I.A.B. should concern itself with the detailed performance of those functions. He said that General Vandenberg was responsible solely to the N.I.A. and was expected to consult with the departments only sufficiently to ensure coordination.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the way the directive was written, the I.A.B. was more than an adviser. It is a two-way street and a link between C.I.G. and the departmental agencies. He felt that the I.A.B. had a responsibility for the operations of C.I.G.

✓ GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that he has the right to put out what C.I.G. thinks is correct. However, to fulfill its obligation as an interdepartmental agency, C.I.G. must have the views of the four departmental agencies. He felt it was best that C.I.G. have not only the agencies' views, but the reasons for these views. He agreed with Admiral Inglis that the I.A.B. has a responsibility to see, not whether C.I.G. is doing the wrong thing but that it is doing the right thing. In other words, General Vandenberg felt that the solution lay somewhere between the views of Admiral Inglis and of General Chamberlin.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that his viewpoint was that a person of General Vandenberg's caliber should be entrusted to find his own method for determining departmental views. If General Vandenberg sees a difference of opinion, it would be assumed that he would check it with the departments concerned. This should be easy, since C.I.G. will always have close liaison with the departments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that it was a fundamental question whether the I.A.B. has a responsibility for C.I.G. operations. He thought that if General Chamberlin's philosophy were followed to its ultimate conclusion, it would mean that ten years from now O.N.I. would still have to have its same basic organization, since it would not be able to entrust C.I.G. to perform functions for it. If, however, O.N.I. has responsible Naval people within C.I.G., O.N.I. would then feel that the Navy's views were being represented. He felt that C.I.G. could not go off by itself. If the departmental agencies are represented, C.I.G. could then perform many duties which are now being performed by each departmental agency.

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MR. EDDY felt that the new budget plans for C.I.G. indicated a shift, since C.I.G. may now employ its own people. He did not feel, however, that this eliminated the possibility of having C.I.G. serve the departments. If each department concentrates on its primary interests, then C.I.G. can perform functions of secondary interest and special jobs which no departmental agency can perform. Then, so long as the I.A.B. is a two-way street, C.I.G. and the departmental agencies can make available the best service each to the other.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that this would not work unless the departments were represented in C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if he were called upon to submit a Naval estimate he would go to the Navy. He felt General Vandenberg would do the same. He thought, however, that if General Vandenberg felt the data on hand in C.I.G. corresponded to the opinions of the departments, General Vandenberg should be authorized to send that data forward as an intelligence estimate.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was afraid that if people in C.I.G. fail to represent the departmental viewpoint, C.I.G. would get off the track. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should be in close contact with the departments in order to obtain departmental views. He said that he was encouraging all C.I.G. personnel to get the views of all three departments.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was confident C.I.G. would do that, especially since Army officers in C.I.G. are always subject to detail and rotation. He thought that the War Department's viewpoint would be represented because of the years of Army training each Army officer in C.I.G. would have. He thought that C.I.G. personnel should express their own views and not pattern them after the opinion of someone in an outside agency.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that the idea was to assign people to C.I.G. in order to form a link with the departments, to utilize the sources therein, and have the benefit of the combined thinking of all departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that Admiral Inglis' objective could be gained by having representatives detailed to O.R.E.

MR. LAY pointed out that the procedure to be followed by each representative in clearing papers was a matter for decision by each I.A.B. member. Admiral Inglis could instruct his representative not to vote until Admiral Inglis had approved each estimate.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to appoint a representative part-time, but that this representative would act only as a messenger.

MR. EDDY said that he would like to see this system tried. He thought that each I.A.B. member might designate a deputy who was well trained and could bring papers to the respective I.A.B. members for clearance when necessary.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would give his representative the responsibility for deciding whether to act on an estimate or to clear it with General Chamberlin. General Chamberlin felt, however, that this arrangement should not prevent C.I.G. research personnel from working closely with G-2 research sections.

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GENERAL CHAMBERLIN then expressed the belief that C.I.G. estimates sent to the President should not show a dissenting opinion.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that the President should know of any dissenting opinions, although he hoped that any differences could be reconciled before the estimates were issued. He felt, however, that estimates should not be held up unduly in an effort to reconcile divergent views.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if each paper were handled in detail it would defeat the purpose of C.I.G., since every word or shade of meaning would be questioned.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that this was the procedure used in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although it had not worked perfectly, he felt that for every example where this procedure had failed to work there were ten examples where it had worked.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has no head or commander, as is the case in C.I.G.

MR. LAY pointed out that the wording of N.I.A. Directive No. 1 requires only that "substantial dissent" should be noted in C.I.G. estimates, which was intended to preclude discussion of every word or shade of meaning.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the concept of N.I.A. was that all departments would be represented in all matters. The Director of Central Intelligence is the executive responsible for carrying out the policies of the N.I.A. The I.A.B. is more than merely an adviser. All through the N.I.A. and C.I.G. structure it was intended that there be equal representation of all departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that it is a matter of record in N.I.A. minutes that the N.I.A. is the agency responsible to the President, and not the Director of Central Intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible to the I.A.B., but rather to the N.I.A.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out, however, that the N.I.A. has delegated to the I.A.B. the right to concur for the N.I.A. members. Therefore, in the final analysis the I.A.B., by this delegation, has a measure of responsibility for the success of C.I.G. activities.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN questioned how this would work, since many other agencies of the Government were involved.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that this was covered by the fact that other agencies sat as members of the I.A.B. on matters of interest to those agencies.

After further discussion of detailed amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1,

#### THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Concurred in the issuance of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 16/1 subject to amendment to read as follows:

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- "1. To implement the provisions of Paragraph 6 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a personal representative to remain assigned to his office and detailed as liaison to the Projects Division of the Intelligence Staff of the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Central Intelligence Group.
- "2. These representatives will, as their chiefs direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelligence estimates or present dissenting opinions.
- "3. Each intelligence estimate issued by C.I.G. will either have the concurrence of all I.A.B. members or will have any substantial dissent appended as a part of the estimate or follow as provided in 4 below.
- "4. This procedure will not be permitted to prevent the presentation of any estimate on the required date. If concurrence or dissenting opinions cannot be obtained in time to meet deadlines for completion and submission of estimates, such estimates will be submitted together with a statement that only limited coordination has been attained and substantial dissent, if any, will be submitted at a later date.
- "5. C.I.G. will afford designated representatives complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates."

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32).

3. PLAN FOR COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE  
(C.I.G. 17)

GENERAL VANDENBERG gave a brief description of the plan recommended in C.I.G. 17.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN raised the question as to whether Paragraph 2-c of the proposed C.I.G. Directive would authorize biographic intelligence data of one department to be made available to another department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that if the biographic intelligence data of one department was not available to other departments, such a system would cause a great deal of duplication.

MR. EDDY stated that he believed the word "responsibility" should be left out of the first sentence of paragraph 2-c.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was agreeable to this omission.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he objected to the last sentence in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, since O.N.I. does have a good index system and it is maintained up to date.

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MR. EDGAR stated that at the time the covering memorandum was written he did not know that the Navy's index system had been completed.

ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned whether this proposed Directive would govern domestic coverage and, if so, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have a chance to express its views on the matter under consideration.

GENERAL VANDENBERG replied that the paper did not govern domestic coverage, and was for foreign biographic intelligence only.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the majority of inquiries made to O.N.I. were in the domestic field and he felt that this paper was too elaborate a plan for the coordination of foreign biographic intelligence.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that if the plan in this paper did not work, it could be recalled.

MR. EDGAR stated that it was desirable to get approval on this paper in order to gain proper coordination in the field.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he should have central machine records in order to point out biographic intelligence information contained in other agencies.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed.

MR. EDDY stated that the provisions of paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum would cause too much work for the State Department to undertake at this time, since the State Department had a mass of biographic information that dated back to 1790, and that to reproduce this information would be a staggering job.

MR. EDGAR explained that it was not the intent of this paper to reproduce all biographic information presently on file in the departments, but rather C.I.G. would start anew from a given date, and the information contained in the central file would be only enough to indicate the type of personality whose name appeared on each card. This would make it possible to decide whether it was desirable to obtain further details from the department having the basic file on a given individual.

MR. HECK stated that the State Department drew from a wider scope than would be reported on standard forms, and that only one or two per cent of the names in State Department file would be covered by standard report forms. He suggested that each agency concentrate on an assigned area of responsibility.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was heartily in favor of a central file which could be consulted rather than having to contact all of the agencies in each case on which information might be desired.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that to have to go to the files of each agency on each case would take a lot of unnecessary time.

MR. HECK reiterated that such a central file would show only a small per cent of the names presently on file in the State Department.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the central file proposed would be starting anew, and, while he realized it would be slow in building up, eventually it would be of benefit to all concerned.

MR. HECK stated that he believed that if the information contained on these cards got much beyond a name stage, it would involve too much duplication.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that there would naturally have to be some duplication. However, at the present time, with the volume of files in the agencies and no central index system, no one knows exactly what we do have.

MR. HECK felt that this proposal would put a heavy burden on the departmental agencies, since it would require additional people to extract the information and put it on standard cards.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that each time an agency made a summary for its own index, it send a copy to C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that to eliminate workload, cards for C.I.G. be prepared on each new report from the field or whenever departmental agencies took action to prepare a summary--as, for example, in answer to a request. He thought that on this basis the C.I.G. file would be very useful five years from now.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that was all C.I.G. asked the agencies to do.

MR. EDGAR said that C.I.G. would be willing to receive the standard form on new field reports, and copies of completed summary reports which are prepared by the agencies in answer to a request. He said that in the latter case C.I.G. would be willing to make up the central file card.

MR. HECK pointed out that this would mean that C.I.G. had a very incomplete file, representing only about five per cent of the State Department's files.

MR. EDGAR expressed the belief that, if C.I.G. received all completed summary reports, it would have information at least on personalities in which there is an active interest.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that would be true in many cases, but pointed out that it would be a long time before any reliance could be felt that C.I.G.'s list was complete.

MR. EDDY stated that he believed this file should be called the central index.

MR. EDGAR stated that he believed the name of the file should indicate that it contained more than just names.

MR. EDDY suggested that the file be called a "reference index file".

ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence, be omitted.

The Enclosure to C.I.G. 17 was then discussed and amendments thereto agreed upon by the Board.

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THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

- a. Agreed that the phrase "nor does any department keep a master index of their own biographic files", at the end of paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, should be deleted.
- b. Concurred in the recommendation in paragraph 3-b of the covering memorandum of C.I.G. 17, subject to insertion of the word "index" between "reference" and "file" on the second line thereof.
- c. Concurred in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 17, subject to the following amendments:
  - (1) Delete the word "responsible" from the second line of paragraph 2-c.
  - (2) Reword the first sentence of paragraph 3-a to read as follows: "The chief of mission of each embassy, legation or foreign post has the over-all responsibility, in accordance with the principles of this Directive, for coordinating the collection of biographic intelligence in his geographical area."
  - (3) Delete paragraph 3-b-(7)
  - (4) Delete paragraph 5-b,

(Subsequently issued as C.I.G. Directive No. 16).

4. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINA  
(C.I.G. 19)

MR. EDDY suggested that this item be postponed until the next I.A.B. meeting.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, since he had not had sufficient time to study this paper. He expressed the belief, however, that the titles of Parts I and II of the proposed N.I.A. directive were reversed.

MR. EDGAR asked if, since the proposed directive had the concurrence of representatives of the I.A.B., the Board would authorize use of the directive, pending final approval, as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would like to know what collection responsibilities are involved before deciding what information should be collected.

MR. EDGAR explained that it was felt that the collection people must know what information the researchers want before they can decide on the assignment of collection responsibilities.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that although he felt the wording could be improved, he was prepared to approve the directive as it stands.

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After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

- a. Agreed to defer consideration of C.I.G. 19 until a meeting next Thursday, 7 November 1946.
- b. Pending final approval, authorized the use of the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19 as a basis for the preparation by an interdepartmental group of a collection directive.

5. STATUS OF N.I.A. 6

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what was being done on N.I.A. 6, in view of the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission.

MR. LAY explained that N.I.A. 6 was presently awaiting approval by the President, and that General Vandenberg was taking steps to get a decision on this matter.

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I. A. B. 10th Meeting

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2169  
New War Department Building  
on Thursday, 7 November 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS -- CHINA  
 (C.I.G. 19)  
 For consideration of the recommendation contained  
 in C.I.G. 19, as agreed at the last I.A.B. meeting.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 (C.I.G. 15)  
 For further consideration of the problems presented  
 in C.I.G. 15.
3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC  
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
 (C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 13/1)  
 For consideration of the committee report contained  
 in C.I.G. 13/1.

JAMES S. LAY JR.  
 Secretary, N.I.A.

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 2169  
New War Department Building  
on Thursday, 7 November 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

✓ Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of  
 Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

- ✓ Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
- ✓ Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.
- ✓ Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence
- ✓ Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2

ALSO PRESENT

- ✓ Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
- ✓ Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
- ✓ Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.I.T.
- ✓ Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
- ✓ Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SUPERINTENDENT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

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**1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINA  
(C.I.G. 19)**

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he had difficulty understanding the purpose of this paper. If it was intended to cover over-all long-range intelligence requirements, he felt that it was incomplete. If, however, it covered only some intermediate objective, he did not have much to say except to suggest a few minor changes.

MR. EDGAR explained that this paper did not cover departmental requirements, which it was assumed would be drawn up by the various agencies. He pointed out, however, that uncoordinated and uncorrelated sets of instructions were going out to the field which did not completely fill national requirements. Therefore, the only requirements put in this paper were those which are most important from a national viewpoint. This paper covered only China as a trial area. It did not attempt, however, to define the ultimate requirements for national policy intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that only three subjects were covered, whereas there are many others of interest to the War Department.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the War Department was expected to send those out, except in those cases where C.I.G. might specifically ask for additional information.

MR. EDGAR explained that at the first interdepartmental meeting on coordination of the intelligence effort, it was agreed that the first step should be to develop a coordinated collection of intelligence requirements area by area throughout the world. Each agency representative was asked to turn in the requirements it considered most important. These were then synthesized by the Office of Reports and Estimates in C.I.G. Some of the information required was of interest to more than one department, and when the departments agreed, these requirements were put in the paper. If this paper is approved, the collection representatives from all agencies will look over Part II in order to decide which field representatives are best located to obtain the desired information and to attempt to allocate these requirements to the various field agencies.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not see how coordination could be accomplished in this way unless the whole problem was solved.

MR. EDDY pointed out that this was merely a test case, and that this paper might look radically different a year from now.

MR. EDGAR noted that these requirements would be reviewed quarterly.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN asked why other items of importance, such as topographic data, were not included.

MR. EDGAR explained that no attempt had been made to include static or basic intelligence! Also, no scientific intelligence requirements were included because it was felt there was nothing of interest in this area.

ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that these requirements covered only those that are currently essential.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed the belief that this was intended to be an attempt to coordinate the whole collection effort in China.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that it was impossible to do this until the agencies had agreed on more basic issues, such as assignment of primary responsibilities. Meanwhile, this was an attempt to move forward as far as possible.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands, but that he was also baffled by the wording "Essential Elements of National Intelligence". He thought they were all right, however, as targets for the next three months and as a trial case.

MR. EDDY said that he was willing to approve the paper as it stands.

GENERAL VANDENBURG said that the value of this paper would depend upon the effort which all agencies put behind it.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that if the three items mentioned were considered the most important, the War Department would fulfill its part of the effort as a matter of priority.

GENERAL SAMFORD understood that this was an experiment in stating current emphasis. He considered the paper all right as it is.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN expressed the belief that the terminology was twisted.

MR. EDGAR explained that the first step had been to study national policy toward China, on the theory that intelligence should operate for the policy-makers, to show them whether the policy was a success or needed change. It was felt that the essential elements were stated too broadly and were therefore broken down into collection requirements which could be turned over to the collection representatives to draft a collection directive. He realized that the terms used were somewhat different from military usage, but that the four agency representatives had agreed upon the present terminology. C.I.G., however, did not feel strongly about making a change in the terminology. Mr. Edgar suggested, and it was agreed, that "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" should be changed to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence".

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would prefer not to approve the paper until he had seen the collection directive based thereon. He did agree tentatively that the paper was all right as a basis for preparation of a further collection directive.

ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that the meeting of collection representatives be held to break down the requirements into allocations to each agency. These could then be checked with the I.A.B., and when approved each agency would issue directives to accomplish its part of the mission.

GENERAL VANDENBURG asked if a further I.A.B. meeting would be necessary if the representatives of the agencies agreed on the collection directive.

ADMIRAL INGLIS did not think it would be necessary to put the paper on the agenda for another meeting, but felt that it could be checked informally with the I.A.B. members and issued as another C.I.G. paper.

MR. EDDY suggested approval of the paper with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until assignment of collection responsibilities was agreed upon.

In answer to Mr. Eddy, MR. EDGAR said that the directives would be distributed to ambassadors and theater commanders through the appropriate departments.

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After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

a. Agreed upon the following amendments to the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19:

(1) Change "Essential Elements of National Intelligence" to read "Current Essentials of National Intelligence" throughout the paper.

(2) In paragraph 1, line 4, change "requirements" to read "objectives".

b. Approved the Enclosure to C.I.G. 19, as amended, tentatively as a basis for the preparation of a subsequent collection directive, with the understanding that distribution would be withheld until the collection directive had been agreed upon.

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (C.I.G. 15)

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that consideration of this problem had been deferred at a previous I.A.B. meeting, and requested any further comments.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the matter had been discussed in the J.I.C. It was a complicated problem, and it was hard to decide whether J.I.C. or I.A.B. should discuss it further. He said that the Navy Department feels that one solution is General Vandenberg's original proposal, which goes much farther than Admiral Inglis' proposal in C.I.G. 15. Admiral Inglis circulated a sketch showing how the Navy thought General Vandenberg's proposal might be put into effect. This involved moving the J.I.C. and the J.I.S. into the structure of the C.I.G. It also formed a link between the J.C.S. and the Director of Central Intelligence and between J.C.S. subcommittees and the C.I.G. It proposed a change in the membership of J.I.C. to service members only, plus the addition of the Director of Central Intelligence as a member in the same manner as on the I.A.B. With the change in membership it was suggested that the name be changed to Joint Intelligence Board (J.I.B.). Admiral Inglis thought that in peacetime the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible to the N.I.A., but that this might be reversed in wartime to make him responsible to the J.C.S. He felt that this proposal provided a necessary security wall around the military activities of J.I.C. The J.I.S. membership would stay the same except for the elimination of the State Department member. Liaison with the State Department, however, would be continued, but through the I.A.B. rather than the J.I.C.

ADMIRAL INGLIS explained that for the preparation of intelligence estimates the proposed J.I.S. would go both to O.R.E. and, for departmental intelligence, to the other departments. J.I.S. would belong to the J.I.B., with lateral communications with C.I.G.

MR. EDDY thought that might be an ultimate solution, but suggested as an interim step that the J.I.S. serve as an intelligence advisory staff to the I.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he had not figured out a solution to the problem yet, but that he did have some fundamental principles which he felt should be considered. First of all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must remain an essentially military agency. General Chamberlin felt, however, that General Eisenhower would be hesitant to change any existing arrangements for coordination with the State Department.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he would like to make it perfectly clear that the Navy Department wants a link with the State Department and considers it absolutely essential. There is no intent, in the proposal he just outlined, to stop such coordination. It was felt, however, that coordination with the State Department would be adequately assured through the J.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that the mission of the Director of Central Intelligence goes far beyond the scope of the J.C.S. Therefore, nothing should be done to circumscribe C.I.G. into a lesser mission. This is a second fundamental which General Eisenhower feels should be observed. Third, it would be bad to circumscribe free and direct contact, especially in wartime, from the J.C.S. to the President. Fourth, there should be nothing in the arrangement, as far as the making of war plans is concerned, which interpolates a civilian agency between planning agencies of the J.C.S., but, as General Vandenberg noted, these J.C.S. agencies should not be denied any intelligence necessary to enable them to perform their mission. Fifth, no agencies other than strictly military should have access to military plans. This should be a matter of right on the part of military agencies, for security reasons. General Chamberlin said that he was unable to figure out an organization which observed all of those fundamental principles. He felt, however, that there was great advantage in Admiral Inglis' original suggestion in C.I.G. 15, since it would at least provide a piecemeal approach to the problem.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the principles enunciated by General Chamberlin were also the objectives for which the C.I.G. was striving. He pointed out that the C.I.G. proposal provided a watertight compartment for the military. He observed, however, that allied to that consideration is the fact that the war planners must have the best intelligence and that it must be constantly supplied to them. The intelligence agency, therefore, should work right along with the planners. Specifically, General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Inglis' new proposal established a watertight military compartment, but placed it next to the C.I.G., where it could draw on all available intelligence.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that there were some subjects covered by J.I.C. subcommittees which C.I.G. should not have.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that some could be put under the J.I.B. and others, such as the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board and the Publications Review Subcommittee, could be integrated into C.I.G.

MR. EDDY said that he was willing to accept Admiral Inglis' new proposal as an ultimate objective. He thought, however, that it would be possible to proceed immediately to liquidate the J.I.C. subcommittees and then follow that with Admiral Inglis' proposal.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that it would be difficult to justify the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 until a broad plan had been presented for approval. He thought that the broad plan should first be approved in principle and then the initial step approved for immediate implementation. He noted that if the process stopped after the initial step had been taken, C.I.G. would be accountable but not responsible.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that one difficulty which had been discovered in his proposal in C.I.G. 15 was that personnel assigned to J.C.S. subcommittees may not be assigned additional duties without the approval of the J.C.S. He agreed with General Vandenberg that the ultimate objective should be presented at the same time that the initial step is submitted for approval.

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MR. EDDY felt that the question of the ultimate objective involved very broad considerations. He pointed out that there were three policy-forming groups -- namely, the State Department in the political field, the J.C.S. in the military field, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in politico-military matters. He thought that the relationship of those groups should be carefully considered and presented in any ultimate solution. He felt that it might be premature to attempt to outline the ultimate objective.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that it might be possible to show the end objective in broad terms, how far it was now possible to go, and why the initial step was being taken.

MR. EDDY felt that this would require considerable time-consuming staff work to prepare. Therefore, he would like to see the first step taken as soon as possible.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that if there was general agreement, Admiral Inglis' new proposal could be used as the ultimate objective and the proposal in C.I.G. 15 as the initial step. He suggested that people from ICAPS and the agencies be designated to write up such a proposal for consideration by the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN stated that he could not say at this time that he approved the end result suggested by Admiral Inglis. He thought a way should be found to get the intelligence from C.I.G. without interpolating C.I.G. into the J.C.S. He explained that he was not opposed to General Vandenberg personally, but was in general doubtful of the wisdom of mixing up in the J.C.S. the head of an agency who reported to civilian authority.

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked if, in case of war, it would not be desirable to have the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group under the command of the J.C.S.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that in case of war he thought that the C.I.G. should be brought into the J.C.S. organization and made responsible for the whole intelligence effort. He granted that this would involve abolishing the J.I.C.

ADMIRAL INGLIS expressed the belief that the J.C.S. would not agree to abolish the J.I.C., any more than they would to the abolition of the Joint War Plans Committee. He noted that at present the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the N.I.A. His proposal was that the Director of Central Intelligence be assigned additional duties to serve the J.C.S. If at any time the Director of Central Intelligence was not agreeable to the J.C.S., the J.C.S. could easily cancel the agreement.

MR. EDDY said that he agreed with this proposal, but noted that it must be submitted to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed because he felt that they would want to know what lay behind the initial step.

MR. EDDY thought that would be desirable, but felt that if they could not agree on the ultimate objective, the initial step should be recommended as improving liaison between C.I.G. and J.I.C.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he would like to wait a week or so to see if staff members could not write something which would be agreeable to the I.A.B.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he could not see what progress would be made, because he was fundamentally opposed to the principles involved in Admiral Inglis' new proposal.

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GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he felt it was the responsibility of the I.A.B. to recommend approval of some plan. He suggested, therefore, that if there was disagreement within the I.A.B., both a majority and a minority report be submitted to the N.I.A. He noted that nothing was being done about this situation at the present time. He wanted to stop unnecessary duplication, and felt that the solution of this problem was one of the best ways to avoid it.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN believed that the Director of Central Intelligence should not be on the J.I.B.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that if the Director of Central Intelligence is made responsible for furnishing intelligence, he must know the purpose which the intelligence is to serve.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt there was some way to provide for a lateral communication with the Director of Central Intelligence in order to obtain intelligence which would then go up through the J.I.B. He thought that the initial step proposed in C.I.G. 15 was worth trying.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this would put either the Director of Central Intelligence or the J.I.C. in an untenable position if it lasted for long. He said that he would agree to that arrangement for a short period, but that there must be a limit placed on its duration.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that the proposal in C.I.G. 15 was all right as a first step, but that it would not solve the problem. It would not tie C.I.G. in close enough with the J.I.C., and it would not eliminate all of the duplication.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he could understand General Vandenberg's objections. He thought, therefore, that General Vandenberg's suggestion for preparation of a staff paper was best. It would then be possible to see what points could be agreed on, and to put up a minority report on those points that are not agreed. He said that he thought it was a responsibility of the J.I.C. to get intelligence from the C.I.G. He hoped to see a solution. He thought that the J.I.S. should work with the C.I.G. to get intelligence, provided security of military information was not jeopardized.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that this would lead to the same difficulty that the J.I.C. is now encountering with the Joint War Plans Committee, in not knowing what is wanted. He felt strongly that if C.I.G. was asked for intelligence without being familiar with what was involved, it would put out intelligence without giving it proper weight or considering the ramifications or including all of the intelligence that might be available.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not think that C.I.G. should be taken into military planning.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that Admiral Inglis' new proposal would provide a watertight military compartment within C.I.G.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that there must be a watertight compartment somewhere. The question is just where it should be established.

After further discussion,

#### THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Designated the following individuals as representatives to work with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning

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Staff of C.I.G. in drafting proposed recommendations to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S. on the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S., including, if necessary, a majority and minority report:

For Mr. Eddy:	Mr. Merritt B. Booth Mr. A. Sidney Buford
For General Chamberlin:	Colonel E. J. Treacy, Jr. Colonel L. L. Williams Colonel J. K. Dickey
For Admiral Inglis:	Captain R. K. Davis Captain F. S. Habecker
For General McDonald:	Colonel E. P. Mussett Colonel L. C. Sherman
For Secretariat, J.I.C.:	Captain R. U. Hyde

3. ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN THE FIELD OF STATIC INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 13/1)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that ICAPS was now trying to solve the basic issues in the subject papers. Therefore, even if this specific study were cancelled as proposed in C.I.G. 13/1, this would not mean that further action on the subject would not be taken.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to concur in C.I.G. 13/1, but that he wanted the record to show that the Navy will go just as far as other participating departments in collaborative efforts in this field.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would like to state some principles which he felt should govern the solution of this problem. First of all, he felt that each department should be supreme in its field of primary responsibility. For example, in its field of primary responsibility he did not think that the War Department could assign its functions to another agency because the War Department is charged by law with performing them. General Chamberlin thought, therefore, that the first thing to do was to assign areas of primary responsibility to each department. Then matters which are not in the field of these primary responsibilities should be assigned to C.I.G. He thought that those assignments should carry into the field of collection, but that they should not draw a narrow corridor which would prevent any field representative from getting useful information.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he thought everyone agreed to these principles, but he questioned whether they had been transmitted to the agency representatives who were working with ICAPS.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that the implementation of those principles should be carefully timed to cause a minimum of interruption in the performance of necessary functions. He expressed the belief that the War Department now had the best balanced intelligence agency, and was fully engaged in the preparation of Strategic Intelligence Digests (S.I.D.). He hoped to obtain permission to complete these S.I.D.'s as a basis for assignment of responsibilities. Even after responsibilities had been assigned, he felt that each department must have a unit which is capable of presenting the whole picture to the officials of that department. He therefore would like to see the War Department preserve a strong Military Intelligence Service to fulfill the requirements of the Chief of Staff. For example, the War Department was working on war potential, which covers a very wide field. On this matter, the War

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Department was getting advice from other departments, but nevertheless was ultimately responsible for that field. He hoped that this statement of fundamentals would indicate the reason why he was voting as he had.

ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that the principles were fine, but required definition. For example, what is military intelligence? He felt that while it was granted that the War Department was responsible for military intelligence, it should also be granted that the War Department must get intelligence elsewhere in order to complete the picture. This meant looking to other departments over which the War Department had no authority.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was perfectly willing to trust the State Department, Navy Department, and Air Forces for the intelligence in their fields of primary responsibility.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought, then, that if it was granted that the War Department must obtain intelligence from agencies other than those under its command, it then became a question of which agency or agencies were best qualified and most efficient to produce the intelligence required. That was the principle Admiral Inglis had in mind in C.I.G. 13. He thought it would be possible to pool items of common interest in C.I.G. Then each agency would make available all that it received in those fields, and would draw off from C.I.G. what it needed. Admiral Inglis noted that General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz had directed General Craig and Admiral Inglis to join M.I.D. and O.N.I. in all possible fields. He said that an effort had been made to accomplish this, but that nothing had happened. Now with C.I.G. formed, he thought it might be possible to turn over some of these functions of common interest to C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN did not recall having seen the directive to which Admiral Inglis referred, but said that he was nevertheless willing to follow the principles which he had enunciated.

MR. EDDY said that he was in sympathy with the committee report, C.I.G. 13/1. He would like, however, to see the responsibility and functions of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board transferred to C.I.G. He said that if that recommendation were made, he would vote for it.

GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed appreciation for Mr. Eddy's suggestion, but felt that it was first necessary to settle the broader questions involved. If action was blocked after such piecemeal steps had been taken, it would not help the over-all intelligence picture.

GENERAL SAMFORD thought that the guiding principle was that the functions required by each agency staff must be performed in that staff. Everything else he was willing to centralize.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that an example was the question of war potential in Russia. He noted that the War Department was now engaged in a comprehensive study of that subject, and he wondered whether it was intended that this project should be stopped.

ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that was an excellent example, since it involved intelligence of interest to all three departments. While G-2 was responsible for furnishing that data to the Chief of Staff, Military Attaches and other War Department sources were not adequate to get what was needed. The same thing is true in the Navy and State Departments. No one agency is competent to get all that information; each must rely on the other. Each now has a collecting agency feeding in that type of material. Admiral Inglis said that his idea was that when this information was received,

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instead of each agency having about a hundred people picking the brains of other agencies, fifty from each department could be transferred into C.I.G., where, with half the people, they would receive all departmental source material and do a better job.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed that this was all right in theory, but that it would cause delay. For example, the War Department has already written hundreds of pages on all countries, and he did not think that work should be interrupted.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that his example was something that could be worked up to. He did not think that any project should be interrupted until it could be taken over efficiently by C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, and said that he thought that 30 June 1947 would be a date on which his projects could be turned over to some other agency.

ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended that the procedure be worked out step by step and extend over a period of time.

GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that each agency, when it transferred a function to C.I.G., should still have a feeling of responsibility and an interest in seeing that the people who were working on the project were also transferred, in order to ensure the best possible product.

ADMIRAL INGLIS said that 30 June 1947 was an agreeable date for turning over to C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would be willing to furnish surplus personnel available on that date. He pointed out, however, that G-2 had already let out some 700 individuals and was about down to its minimum requirements for military intelligence. In fact, there were fields of military intelligence which G-2 is not now covering. Therefore, when the S.I.D.'s are completed, G-2 would have to turn those people to the performance of some other G-2 function.

ADMIRAL INGLIS felt that there were two additional principles that should be recognized: First, each agency, in fulfilling its responsibilities, must collaborate with other agencies to complete the picture. Second, each agency has a responsibility for the successful performance of C.I.G.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he felt a responsibility, as a member of the I.A.B., for the manner in which C.I.G. grows. On the other hand, he felt that one responsibility of C.I.G. was to build strong organizations in the departments to fulfill their primary functions.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed, but noted that C.I.G. has no control over that matter at the present time.

After further discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the recommendation in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 13/1, with the understanding that the basic issues involved are under continuing study by ICAPS and agency representatives.

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IAB 10th Meeting

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COPY NO. 34

I.A.B. 11th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178  
New War Department Building  
on Tuesday, 26 November 1946, at 10:00 A.M.

1. COORDINATION OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES  
(C.I.G. 18/2)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 18/2.

2. PRODUCTION OF POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY ON U.S.S.R.  
(C.I.G. 20)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 20.

3. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES  
(C.I.G. 21)

For consideration of the recommendations  
contained in C.I.G. 21.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 11th Meeting

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~~SECRET~~I.A.B. 16th MeetingCOPY NO. 35INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117  
North Interior Building  
on Thursday, 11 September 1947 at 2:00 P.M.

1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD  
ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(CIG 24/2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in CIG 24/2 and its enclosure thereto.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in the enclosure to IAB 1/2.

3. REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
GROUP

For discussion of the plan outlined in a memorandum to the individual members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 15 August 1947 - Subject: "Reorganization of Central Intelligence Group".

J. S. EARMAN  
Secretary, N.I.A.

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16th IAB Meeting

COPY NO. 17INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117,  
North Interior Building  
on Thursday, 11 September 1947 at 2:00 P. M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director  
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of State for Research and Intelli-  
gence  
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval  
Intelligence  
Major General George C. McDonald, Assistant  
Chief of Air Staff-2  
Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich, Director of  
Intelligence and Security, Atomic Energy  
Commission  
Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director  
of Intelligence, WDGS

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group  
Colonel Merritt B. Booth, Department of State  
Captain R. K. Davis, USN  
Colonel E. P. Mussett, AAF-2  
Colonel G. C. Nye, AAF-2  
Lt. Colonel Edgar J. Treacy, WDGS  
Capt. Patrick Henry, USN

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

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16th IAB Meeting

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1. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(CIG 24/2)

ADMIRAL HILLENKOFFTER stated that the ad hoc committee appointed to prepare recommendations on the subject paper to the Intelligence Advisory Board was in agreement with the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 24/2, with the exception that the member from the Intelligence Division, WDGS, and the member from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 did not concur in the inclusion of paragraph 4 in the enclosure to CIG 24/2.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he wished to recommend that the fourth sentence of paragraph 1 be amended to read as follows:

"If the IAB proposes to refer any such recommendation to a special study group or otherwise to delay the presentation of the recommendation to the NIA (NSC), but the Director of Central Intelligence considers such delay inadvisable, the IAB members shall have seven working days, after receipt of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding such delay, for the submission of any desired statement of non-concurrence, the basis of which will accompany the recommendation to the NIA (NSC)."

MR. EDDY stated he wished to recommend the insertion of the following sentence between the second and third sentences of paragraph 1:

"Substance of the statement of the non-concurrence shall accompany the statement to the NIA (NSC)."

GENERAL McDONALD noted that it seemed advisable to him to delete paragraph 4, since the contents of that paragraph presented a special problem in itself.

After some discussion the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD approved the enclosure to CIG 24/2 with the following exceptions:

- a. That paragraph 4 thereof be deleted.
  - b. That the changes recommended by Mr. Eddy and Admiral Inglis, as indicated above, be adopted.
2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(IAB 1, IAB 1/1 and IAB 1/2)

THE DIRECTOR requested comments on the recommendations contained in IAB 1/2.

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ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the Chief of Naval Operations felt that in view of the National Security Act of 1947, which established naval aviation as an integral part of the Navy, the position of the Navy should be made clear in all papers which dealt with the jurisdiction, cognizance, or responsibility on the subject of naval aviation. The Navy had, in cooperation with the Intelligence Division, Army Air Forces, an agency called the Air Intelligence Division which has been serving both the Army and Navy and Army Air Forces under instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Navy wanted nothing to occur which would interfere in any way with the present effective operation of the Air Intelligence Division, and further that unless paragraph 4 of the proposed NIA Directive on the coordination of intelligence production was changed as recommended in IAB 1/2, some day after the present incumbents were gone, controversy might arise as to the interests of the Navy in air intelligence and, therefore, a change in the wording of this paragraph as recommended by the Navy was not only advisable and desirable, but necessary to recognize the interest of the Navy in air intelligence.

GENERAL McDONALD stated that on the subject of the Strategic Vulnerability Branch which is in existence - this Branch was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function within the framework of A-2. However, the National Security Act of 1947 does define to some general extent areas of responsibility for the ground, sea and air forces. He had coordinated with the Air Staff the proposed change recommended by the Navy on the subject paper, and as a result the Air Forces recommended that paragraph 4 remain as written.

GENERAL TODD stated that GENERAL CHAMBERLIN thought that the subject paper was not the paper in which to try to define fields of dominant interest, since, if it was attempted to define one field, an attempt should be made to define, for example, military intelligence. GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that there should follow in a subsequent paper, defined in greater detail, fields of dominant interest. However, he felt that the fields of dominant

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interests as outlined in the subject paper were generally satisfactory. GENERAL CHAMBERLIN felt that he did not believe dominant interest could be shared, since each of the member IAB agencies certainly had a great deal of interest in the other fields.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he agreed with GENERAL CHAMBERLIN's thoughts and was willing to make some alteration in the wording of his recommended change to the proposed directive in question. For example, the Navy and Army Air Forces to share air intelligence each to their respective needs.

COLONEL MUSSETT stated that he thought this was taken into account in the definition of staff intelligence. He said that A-2 recognized that each Department must produce all intelligence that was necessary to its own needs.

ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that he did not quite agree with the A-2 viewpoint, since the Navy's need for air intelligence went beyond the question of staff intelligence. He said that naval air intelligence goes into the field of impact of foreign aviation on naval operations, not necessarily air operations, but the naval surface, submarines, amphibious, transports, logistics, and supply, and for that reason the Navy felt that it did have an interest in air intelligence which they believed had to be recognized.

After further discussion, the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD agreed to forward the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production to the NIA, together with the non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member. (Note: The non-concurrence of the Navy member and the comments of the Air member are to be submitted to the Secretary, NIA, within seven working days after date of this meeting.)

### 3. REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE stated he was withdrawing the memorandum to the individual members of the INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, dated 15 August 1947, subject - "Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Group", and would submit new recommendations on this subject.

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**SECRET****4. TRANSFER OF THE JANIS PROGRAM TO CIG**

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked the status of the proposed transfer of the JANIS program to the Central Intelligence Group.

THE DIRECTOR replied that CIG had received a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume responsibility for this program and that necessary action was being taken to effect the transfer of functions and personnel of this activity to the Central Intelligence Group.

**5. OVERALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS  
(CIG 22)**

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked the status of CIG 22.

MR. EDGAR replied that further consideration of this paper was being held pending approval of the proposed directive on the coordination of intelligence production.

**6. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIFS  
(CIG 21 and CIG 21/1)**

ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what had been decided by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE on the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

THE DIRECTOR replied that there was some question as to his authority to expend the sum of approximately \$82,950 to carry out the recommendations contained in the enclosure to CIG 21/1.

After some discussion, THE DIRECTOR agreed to request formal approval from the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY that authority be granted to the Director of Central Intelligence to expend approximately \$82,950 of funds allotted to CIG to carry out the recommendations contained in enclosure to CIG 21/1.

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COPY NO. 36

I.A.B. 12th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 2178  
New War Department Building  
on Tuesday, 17 December 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

1. OVER-ALL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR THE COORDINATION  
OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL  
ESTABLISHMENTS  
(C.I.G. 22)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in  
C.I.G. 22.

J. S. EARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

CONFIDENTIAL  
IAB 12th Meeting

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I.A.B. 13th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in Room 7117  
North Interior Building  
(18th and F Streets N.W.)  
on Thursday, 15 May 1947 at 2:30 P. M.

1. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(I.A.B. #1)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in the report of the ad hoc committee appointed to draft a proposed N.I.A. Directive on "The Coordination of Intelligence Production."

2. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(C.I.G. 24)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in C.I.G. 24.

3. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
(I.A.B. #2)

For consideration of the recommendations contained in I.A.B. #2.

J. S. FARMAN

Acting Secretary, N.I.A.

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IAB 13th Meeting

SECRETCOPY NO. 136I.A.B. 13th Meeting*Sy*CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPINTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117  
North Interior Building  
On Thursday, 15 May 1947, at 2:30 P.M.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director  
 of Central Intelligence, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the  
 Secretary of State for Research and  
 Intelligence  
 Maj. General George C. McDonald, Assistant  
 Chief of Air Staff-2  
 Brig. General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director  
 of Intelligence, W.D.G.S.  
 Capt. Abel C. Sabalot, Acting Chief of  
 Intelligence, O.N.I.

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group  
 Mr. Park Armstrong, Department of State  
 Colonel Riley F. Ennis, U.S.A.  
 Capt. R. K. Davis, U.S.N.  
 Colonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.  
 Lieut. Colonel Frank B. Chappell, U.S.A.  
 Major W. C. Baird, U.S.A.

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Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary, N.I.A.

SECRETIAB 13th Meeting

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~~SECRET~~1. LETTER OF APPRECIATION TO LIEUT. GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE brought to the attention of the Board a proposed letter of IAB appreciation to General Vandenberg submitted by the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The letter was signed by Mr. Eddy and General McDonald and given to Captain Davis to secure the signature of Admiral Inglis. The letter will then be returned to the Secretary, N.I.A., who will secure the signature of General Chamberlin upon his return to Washington, after which it will be forwarded to General Vandenberg.

2. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION  
(I.A.B. #1)

THE DIRECTOR stated if there were no comments on paragraphs 2 a (1) and (2) of the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 a (3) be amended to read as follows: "When completed as provided for above, this outline and initial allocations of production and maintainence responsibilities shall be issued in the name of the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

COLONEL ENNIS noted that General Chamberlin was extremely concerned about the exact wording of this paragraph since he felt that its contents were the backbone of the allocation of personnel, the organization of various agencies for production, and, therefore, that the outline of basic intelligence and initial allocations of production and maintainence responsibilities should be approved on the highest level and that he, General Chamberlin, was particularly anxious to have the phraseology "submitted for N.I.A. approval" included in the paragraph.

After considerable discussion where it was noted by Captain Sabalot that the outline of all basic intelligence and tentative allocations of production and maintainence responsibilities should be submitted for N.I.A. approval rather than issued in the name of

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IAB 13th Meeting

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the N.I.A. by the Director of Central Intelligence,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 a (3) to read as follows: "When completed this outline and tentative allocations of production and maintainence responsibilities shall be submitted for N.I.A. approval and issued as an implementation of this Directive. It is expected . . ." (The remainder of the paragraph to read as presently written.)

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) be amended to read as follows: "The National Intelligence Surveys will be distributed in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence and the agencies concerned."

After some discussion, where it was noted by Major Baird that a proposed outline of National Intelligence Surveys was now being circulated to the agencies for approval,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend the last sentence of paragraph 2 a (4) as recommended by the Director, with the exception that the word "distributed" be changed to "disseminated."

THE DIRECTOR then recommended the word "sometimes" be placed between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1).

After some discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to insert the word "usually" between the words "them" and "without" in paragraph 2 b (1).

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that paragraph 2 b (3) be amended to read as follows: "Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be subject to the overall planning and coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence and shall be based on stated requirements of the agencies and upon their known missions and dominant interest." After discussion

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IAB 13th Meeting

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where Mr. Eddy stated that the Department of State preferred that this paragraph be left unchanged, and Captain Davis stated that ONI has always held the view that dissemination of current intelligence had been going satisfactorily so far, and further, to centralize dissemination in this case when there are so few agencies involved was needless,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that paragraph 2 b (3) should stand as written.

THE DIRECTOR stated that the words "production capabilities" had unwittingly crept into the wording of paragraph 2 c (2). He recommended that these words be omitted and the word "or" be added after the word "responsibility."

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the deletion of the words "production capabilities" and the addition of the word "or" between the words "responsibility" and "recognition."

THE DIRECTOR recommended that the word "intelligence" be added between the words "Any" and "agency" in paragraph 2 c (3).

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved this recommendation without discussion.

THE DIRECTOR then stated A-2 had recommended that paragraph 2 c (4) be amended to read as follows: "For the purposes of paragraph (3) above, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall serve as a general delineation of dominant interests.

Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence	State Department
Military Intelligence	War Department
Naval Intelligence	Navy Department
Air Intelligence	Army Air Forces
Economic and Scientific Intelligence	Each agency in accordance with its respective needs"

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After some discussion, where it was pointed out by Captain Davis that ONI was willing to agree to the amendment of this paragraph as proposed by A-2, with the suggestion that consideration be given to placing this paragraph as a new general paragraph 4, and rewording of the first line to read as follows: "For the purposes of intelligence production the following division . . ."

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Approved the changes as recommended by A-2, together with the additional change suggested by Captain Davis in paragraph 2 c 4.

GENERAL TODD then stated that paragraph 2 d (2) had previously read, when discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce and disseminate national intelligence." After some discussion

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (2) to read as indicated by General Todd.

THE DIRECTOR stated he wished to recommend that one of the following revisions of paragraph 2 d (3) be approved by the Intelligence Advisory Board:

a. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall with the advice of the IAB agencies plan and develop the production of national intelligence with due regard to the production capabilities and dominant interests of the Intelligence Advisory Board and other departmental intelligence agencies concerned."

b. "The Director of Central Intelligence shall plan and develop the production of national intelligence in coordination with the IAB agencies in order that he may obtain from them, within the limits of their capabilities, the departmental intelligence which will assist him in the production of national intelligence."

After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to adopt the revision of paragraph 2 d (3) as indicated in b above.

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IAB 13th Meeting

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COPY NO.

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26 May 1947

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~~SECRET~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPCORRECTION TO MINUTES OF THE 13TH I.A.B. MEETINGMemorandum by the SecretaryMAY 26 1947  
OCT 2

1. Paragraph 3, page 6, of the minutes of the 13th I.A.B. meeting, 15 May 1947, erroneously indicate that the I.A.B. at that meeting agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (4) of the proposed N.I.A. Directive on "Coordination of Intelligence Production" to read:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

WHEREAS

This amendment should have read:

"The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

2. It is, therefore, requested that the enclosed corrected page 6 be substituted for the one now included in the above-mentioned minutes and the superseded page destroyed by burning.

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IAB 13TH MINUTES

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3. It is further requested that the abbreviation "JANIS" appearing in the 9th line on page 7 of subject minutes be changed to the abbreviation "NIS."

J. S. EARMAN

Secretary, N.I.A.

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CORRECTION TO  
IAB 13TH MINUTES

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THE DIRECTOR stated he also wished to recommend that paragraph 2 d (4) be amended to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports and periodic briefs or summaries to be prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually or by the direction of the President or the National Intelligence Authority."

After considerable discussion, where it was brought out that estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities were considered to be those prepared in the past, present and future,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to amend paragraph 2 d (4) to read as follows:  
 "The Director of Central Intelligence shall by agreement with the pertinent agency or agencies request and receive such special estimates, reports, and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual departments or agencies in their fields of dominant interest or in accordance with their production capabilities as may be necessary in the production of intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually."

THE DIRECTOR suggested and

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that the word "sufficient" in the second and fifth lines of general paragraph 3 be changed to "adequate."

CAPTAIN DAVIS stated that ONI felt that before this Directive is issued by the National Intelligence Authority, it should go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a request that they consent to merge the JANIS program with NIS, and further that the Director of Central Intelligence request the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., to consent to merge SID with NIS.

THE DIRECTOR stated it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing a paper recommending that JANIS be

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merged with NIS. However, in the event such a paper did not materialize, it was his desire that the proposed N.I.A. Directive on the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," as amended at this meeting, be forwarded to the National Intelligence Authority recommending that the N.I.A. refer the proposed Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment with reference to the merger of JANIS and NIS, and further that a letter would be prepared to the Director of Intelligence, W.D.G.S., recommending that SID also be merged with ~~JANIS~~<sup>NIS</sup>.

THE DIRECTOR stated he did not agree altogether with paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly that part which stated "with the aid of as many sub-committees as necessary." He went on to say that if G-2 and JIC transferred to the Central Intelligence Group the SID and JANIS programs, he believed that the present IAB Ad Hoc Committee, as an interagency planning board, plus working committees similar to that now operating on the defense project under ORE guidance, would be capable of efficient handling.

CAPTAIN DAVIS stated only one Ad Hoc Committee had been recommended, unless it was necessary to get down to the JISPB, the people who were familiar with the JANIS program. He further stated that no definite number of sub-committees were recommended except as might be necessary to initiate the production of NIS.

COLONEL ENNIS stated that he was in agreement with the Director and that the permanent IAB Committee, if appointed, could invite representatives from the agencies indicated in paragraph 6 d of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

After further discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed that the presently established IAB Ad Hoc Committee would in fact be the committee recommended in paragraph 6 d of the above-mentioned Ad Hoc Committee report and further that representatives of the other agencies would be invited to sit as members as they were needed.

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IAB 13th Meeting

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3. ACTION BY THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON MATTERS  
SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY  
(C.I.G. 24 and C.I.G. 24/1)

After some discussion THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to hold this paper over until the next meeting in order to give the members of the Board an opportunity to study the alternative proposal contained in C.I.G. 24/1.

4. AMENDMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE  
(I.A.B. #2)

THE DIRECTOR stated that he did not feel it was within his province to recommend to the National Intelligence Authority that that Authority amend the definition of strategic and national policy intelligence after such definition had in fact been approved by the N.I.A.

THE DIRECTOR noted that any member of the Intelligence Advisory Board had a perfect right to appeal direct to his N.I.A. member.

After considerable discussion, where it was noted by Captain Davis that ONI wished to gain the views of the other IAB members on the present definition of strategic and national policy intelligence,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed, in the absence of Admiral Inglis, to postpone further discussion on this paper.

5. EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY DOCUMENT REPOSITORIES  
(C.I.G. 21 and C.I.G. 21/1)

THE DIRECTOR stated that in view of the fact that the cost (\$82,950) of carrying out the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee appointed to explore the document situation was not included in the CIG budget, and further that the budget had not been approved, he wished to recommend that action be deferred on this paper pending approval of the CIG budget.

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IAB 13th Meeting

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After some discussion, THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:

Agreed to defer action on C.I.G. 21/1 as recommended by the Director.

6. REPORT BY MR. EDDY

MR. EDDY informed the IAB in detail of an agreement reached between him and the Director with reference to certain proposed action to be taken as a result of the House Appropriations Committee's recommended cut in the State Department's budget.

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IAB 13th Meeting